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Abstract 
This study explores the relationship between attention to managerial issues and organizational 
inertia. Past research shows that rigid cognition makes managers focus on specific issues 
during strategy formulation, and such focus prevents from altering strategies. In this study we 
introduce the idea from an attention based-view that issues move in and out of the focus. 
Analyzing the case of the Sharp Corporation from this viewpoint, it was found that top 
managers frequently changed peripheral issues and their answers while central issues and 
answers remained unchanged. Managers used several issues flexibly for justifying their fixed 
answers for their central issues. From this case, we get some new propositions that flexible 
change of issues rather prevents from changing strategies, if the managers’ cognition is rigid. 
 
JEL code: M10 Business Administration – General 
Keywords: Cognition, attention, managerial issues, organizational inertia, Sharp 
Corporation 
 
  
                                                   
* This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 25285116 (Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)). 
† Associate professor, Graduate school of economics, Osaka University. 
nakagawa@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp 
†† Associate professor, Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, 
Kobe University. ymatsumoto@rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp 
2 
 
Introduction 
This study adds new understandings about how managers’ rigid cognition 
prevents organizational change, by reconsidering the interfering effect of attention and 
issue selection in strategy formulation. It is well established that the decision-makers’ 
attention mediates between their cognition and organizational change (Ocasio, 1997, 
Cho and Hambrick, 2006). Existing studies find, when managers have rigid cognition, 
they attend to a small number of specific issues (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981, 
Hannan and Freeman, 1997), omit others outside of their focus of attention in decision 
making (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972, Heath and palenchar, 2008, Weick, 1995). 
And those attitudes prevent managers from altering strategies (Tripsas and Gavetti, 
2000, Gilbert, 2005). However, the other studies tell us that such dichotomous views 
should be refined: Managerial issues moves in and out of attention as managers’ 
interest changes over time (Barnett, 2008, Ocasio, 1997). In this study, we introduce 
this viewpoint into the former research area: How do shifting attention and issues 
attended work in formulating strategy, when managers have rigid cognition? This is the 
main question of this study. 
To explore this, we undertake an inductive case study of the crisis of Sharp 
Corporation (Sharp). Sharp, one of the most renowned Japanese consumer electronics 
companies, had fallen into a crisis after 2009 mainly because they persisted in a Liquid 
Crystal Display (LCD) focused strategy. Our choice to analyze Sharp’s strategic 
inflexibility allows us to focus on the relationship between manager’s cognitive rigidity, 
issue selection, and the ultimately realized strategy, as we could confirm that the 
company’s top management team and its basic cognition did not change during the 
period. 
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From the case we find that managers in Sharp frequently changed which 
issues they were attending to and their solutions as the environment changed, in order 
to justify their unchanged answers for central issues – namely continuously investing 
in the LCD panel development and production. It was also found that such flexible 
changes in issues and answers rather intensified Sharp’s inflexibility to organizational 
change. From those considerations, we generate some new propositions about why 
managers’ rigid cognition prevents them from altering strategies, that adhesive 
managers exploit non-central issues flexibly in order to keep answers for central issues 
unchanged. 
 
Theory and Research Questions 
Simon (1965) notes that individuals have limited rationality, so managers have to rely 
on a simplified representation of the world, namely, cognition (Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2000, Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). By using this cognition, managers focus their 
attention on a small number of managerial issues (Simon, 1965, Ocasio, 1997), and 
interpret them to generate answers (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985, Weick, 1995). In 
other words, “what decision-makers do depends on what issues and answers they focus 
their attention on.” (Ocasio, 1997, p.187) Such an attention-based view of the firm 
(ABV) has been widely accepted in recent years (Ocasio, 1997, Barnett, 2008). 
In studies on organizational change, the influence of cognition and attention is 
one of the most important topics (Kaplan, 2008, Ocasio, 1997, Nigam and Ocasio, 
2010). While cognition and its resulting focus of attention help managers decide 
courses of action with a certain degree of quality and speed (Barr, Stimpert, and Huff, 
1992, Hoffman, 1999, March and Simon, 1958), they also prevent them from changing 
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organizations (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, Sull, 1999, Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). 
Managers’ cognition is based on their beliefs, knowledge, personalities, and interests. 
As managers’ past experiences form those attributes, so their cognition tends to be 
inflexible, especially when their experiences were successful for a long time (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977, Leonard-Barton, 1992, Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Such rigid 
cognition makes an adhesive attentional structure in managers’ mind, and it constraints 
a number of strategic issues and answers they can take (Baron and Ensley, 2006, Garud 
and Rappa, 1994, Staw, 1981, Reger and Huff, 1993; Fredrickson and Iaquinto, 1989). 
Past studies give us rich evidence that managers with rigid cognition do not take 
different strategic options even in radical technological changes (Kaplan, Murray, and 
Henderson, 2003, Gilbert, 2005, Utterback, 1996), radical market changes (Barr et al., 
1992, Christensen and Bower, 1996), organizational capability restructuring 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992, Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), and organizational identity 
changes (Ashforth, Harrison, and Corley, 2008, Bouchikhi and Kimberly, 2003). 
Along with treatments for issues in the focus of attention, scholars have also 
investigated treatments for issues outside of attention. The issues that managers do not 
regard worth consideration are placed outside of their attention. Managers usually 
judge those objects with simple mechanical rules (March and Simon, 1958, Stanovich 
and West, 2000). Otherwise, managers often ignore (or “fly”) them, consciously or 
unconsciously (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972, Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000, Starback 
and Milliken, 1988). When managers’ cognition is rigid, some important issues are 
continuously moved away from their attention, and it prevents organizational change 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977, Lenard-Barton, 1992). 
Although dominant existing studies examine the effects of rigid cognition on 
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issues both within the focus of attention and outside of it, some scholars imply that 
such a dichotomy is too simple since the degree of attention to issues changes from 
no-attention to full-attention as managers’ attention shifts. Managers have their own 
distribution structure of attention. And managerial issues are scattered in this structure 
(Figure 1) (Barnett, 2008, Ocasio, 1997). Managers decide which issues should be 
dealt with by relying on this structure and interpreting the surrounding situation 
(Barnett, 2008, Bowman and Hurry, 1993, Cho and Hambrick, 2006, Dutton and 
Ashford, 1993, Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001, Yu, Engleman, and Van de Ven, 2005). 
WIthin this structure of attention, some issues located at the center of attention are 
always attended to and some located nearly outside are almost completely ignored, as 
past studies about organizational inertia suggest. However, the other issues are not 
fixed, but rather sometimes picked up and other times not. As the (interpreted) 
environment changes, managers’ structure of attention is reformed and the perceived 
importance of various issues increase or decrease. Dutton and Ashford (1993) stated 
that “An issue becomes strategic when top management believes that it has relevance 
for organizational performance (p. 397).” Therefore, issues being attended to and 
issues not being unattended to are reconsidered when managers recognize substantial 
environmental change (Barnett, 2008, Dutton and Ashford, 1993, Dutton et al., 1997, 
Dutton et al, 2001). 
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Figure 1: The structure of the distribution of managers’ attention and issues 
 
Our goal in this paper is to explore (1) how managers select issues, and (2) 
how this issue selection affects on realized strategy when managers show cognitive 
rigidity. By introducing the viewpoint of issue selection (Ansoff, 1980, Dutton and 
Ashford, 1993, Heath and Palenchar, 2008) we will be able to refine the understanding 
of the effects of cognitive rigidity on organizational inertia. After describing research 
methods, we conduct an inductive case study of Sharp, and articulate a set of formal 
propositions based on the case. 
 
Methods and Data 
This study is based on an inductive case study of Sharp’s success and failure in the 
LCD business from 1998 to 2012. After 1998, when Machida became president, Sharp 
made huge financial and labor investments into LCD-panel development and 
manufacturing. That policy initially brought Sharp great success, but it finally led 
Sharp to the brink of bankruptcy. The Sharp case provides a good example for 
exploring the relationship between issue selection and realized strategy in the presence 
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of cognitive rigidity. Sharp kept its core management team (Machida, Katayama, and 
Okuda) almost unchanged during this period, and they showed a strong adherence to 
possessing and investing in the LCD panel production department. Controlling for 
changes in the management team and of attentional focus, we can focus on the issue 
selection and strategy formulation. 
As our questions have an open-ended nature, we think the case approach will 
be useful for theory building (Glaser and Strauss, 2009, Miles and Huberman, 1994, 
Yin, 2014). We took a medium-term historical perspective to catch the transition of the 
attention, environments and selected strategy. We focused on the top management team 
which has a critical influence on strategic decision making (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). 
Data covering the entire Sharp case were gathered from publicly available 
archival materials, including 14 security reports, 12 information briefings from 
meetings with stockholders, four books (one written by Machida, the then president), 
668 business articles from the Nikkei BP, and 74 articles from Shukan Diamond (both 
Japanese journals), from 1998 to 2012. The book, “100 years of milestones by Sharp 
(Sharp hyaku nen no ayumi)” edited by Sharp, was of especially high value as it served 
as a source for data prior to 1998. 
We mainly use publicly available data since they are considered the 
second-best approach in examining the relationship between psychological and social 
phenomenon (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990, Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003). 
It gives us objective, time-series data about the incident and peoples’ thoughts (Nigem 
and Ocasio, 2010). Although interviews are considered the best sources of data, data 
gathered by interviews in which insiders look back at the incident are not used in this 
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case since interviewees could have several biases like justification, over/under 
valuation, consciousness about political interests, and self-defense. Though published 
sources also have some potential biases in that they are edited for managing 
stockholders or other interested parties, they are thought to be the only sources that 
have a certain degree of quality within the right time-series. In addition, some 
published sources, like security reports, are legally obligated to provide accurate 
information. For these reasons, past research has also used public data as main sources 
about people’s cognition (e.g. Barr, Stimpert, and Huff, 1992, D’Aveni and MacMillan, 
1990, Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003, Nigem and Ocasio, 2010). Thus we 
conclude that, given our theoretical interests in the historical transition of attention and 
its effect on strategy, publicly available data like journal articles is one of the ideal 
sources. 
 Analysis is structured as follows: First, we investigate the transition of 
attention to issues and answers for them from the strategic plan section in Sharp’s 
security reports. Next, we conduct a case description using journal articles, books, 
information briefings for stockholder meetings, and financial data from security reports. 
The case description consists of narratives of Sharp managers and realized facts such 
as implemented strategies and their outcomes. Narratives are used for understanding 
how managers recognize situations, and we examine how they turn into concrete 
actions from realized facts. We integrate those findings about managers’ attention to 
issues, realized strategies, and their outcomes in the following section, and we create 
some propositions about them. 
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Table 1: Issues mentioned in “Business situation and tasks to be tackled” in Sharp’s security reports (1998–2012) 
  Amount 
of deals 
Enhance Change 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 (president)       Machida Katayama Okuda 
LCD TV 15 8 7 En Ch En Ch En En Ch En Ch En Ch En Ch En Ch 
LCD panel development 14 14 0 En En En En En   En En En En En En En En En 
Solar cells 13 11 2 En   En   En En En En En En En Ch En Ch En 
LCD panel manufacturing 11 9 2   En     En En En En En En En Ch En   Ch 
mobile phone strategy 11 7 4       Ch En En Ch En En En En Ch En Ch   
Semiconductor 7 2 5 Ch En Ch Ch Ch Ch En                 
LCD panel supply business 7 5 2         En En En Ch   Ch En       En 
Branding policy 6 3 3         Ch En Ch   Ch En En         
Alliances policy 6 4 3     Ch En     Ch           Ch En Ch 
Health instruments 6 2 2     Ch     En         En Ch En   En 
Information technology 5 2 3 En Ch En Ch                   Ch   
Business model 4 2 2                       Ch En En Ch 
Home appliances 4 1 3         Ch   En Ch           Ch   
Bru-ray recorder 2 1 1                       Ch   En   
LED lighting 1 1 1                         Ch     
Audio equipment 1 1 1         Ch                     
multifunctional printer 1 1 1                           Ch   
Un: the issue was mentioned, and its answer was declared enhancing or unchanging the current policy. 
Ch: the issues was mentioned, and its answer was declared changing the policy from the past one. 
Nothing: the issue was not mentioned. 
Source: Sharp’s security reports (1998–2012)  
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The Case 
The frequency of the treatments of issues in Sharp during 1998–2012 
At the beginning of the case, let us check the transition of the Sharp managers’ attention 
over the course of the period. By checking the frequency of issues and answers given in 
the company’s security reports “Business situation” and the following “Tasks to be 
tackled (Table 1 and Figure 2),” we can confirm that Sharp managers persisted in 
continuing LCD-panel development and manufacturing. In the security reports they 
talked about the LCD TV business, LCD panel development, LCD panel manufacturing, 
the mobile phone business, and solar cells
1
 more than other issues. Those issues were 
dealt with more than 10 times over 15 years. Thus, we can conclude that those issues 
were always positioned at the center of Sharp managers’ attention. 
 
Figure 2: Attention map of Sharp managers for managerial issues and answers 
Source: Sharp’s security reports (1998–2012) 
 
                                                   
1 In 1998-2012 Sharp managers set solar cells as the second main business area and kept investments 
in this department. The high frequency and persistence in “solar cells” shown in Figure 2 reflected this 
situation, and it also makes us confirm the validity of the analytical result that LCD panel 
development and manufacturing was the focus of the attention for Sharp’s manager. 
The ratio of 
declaration 
of change  
The frequency of treatments of issues 
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There are two ways of dealing with issues at the center of attention. The first is 
keeping their answers unchanged. Answers in the area of LCD panel development, 
manufacturing and solar cells did not change very much during the period. Managers 
basically strengthened the technology and manufacturing capacities of LCD panels and 
solar cells. The second way is by altering answers along with environmental shifts. 
LCD-TVs and mobile phones are final products that use LCD panels. Those LCD-related 
businesses were also always positioned at the center of managers’ attention. However, 
Sharp’s top managers frequently decided to change the answers for these issues. How do 
we explain this difference in the way of dealing with things? Currently there is little 
consensus on the subject, so we will consider it in the following historical descriptions. 
The other issues were mentioned in less than half of all opportunities (less than 
eight times). A notable fact is that the answers for those issues were more frequently 
changed than ones at the center of managers’ attention. For example, branding policy was 
picked up by managers in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008. In 2002 Sharp started 
an improvement of its brand image in Japan. In 2004 it changes the way of branding from 
simple image improvement to a strong association with LCD. Managers changed this 
policy again in 2006, from emphasizing branding in Japan to branding in foreign markets. 
Another typical example is alliance policy. It was first mentioned in 2000. At that time 
Sharp declared alliances with some electronics companies, but decided to stop in 2004. 
After that Sharp restarted alliances with global companies in 2010. Thus, from security 
reports, we could conclude that Sharp managers persisted in LCD panel production and 
development, while they frequently changed the handling of other issues at the same time. 
As mentioned before, so far, we have no explanation for these things. From the next 
section, we explore why such differences of handling among issues occurred and how 
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they affected Sharp’s strategy. 
 
Sharp’s evolution using a “spiral strategy”: 1912–1997 
Sharp was founded in 1912 by Tokuji Hayakawa based on his metalworking skill. 
Hayakawa was an inventor who introduced unique products like the Tokubijo buckle in 
1912 and the mechanical pencil in 1915. From those initial innovations, Hayakawa 
established a company philosophy of “We are dedicated to the use of our unique, 
innovative technology to contribute to the welfare of people.” It was named the 
“spiral strategy” and turned into Sharp’s basic business approach. It was 
characterized by the simultaneous evolution of core devices and final products. 
Based on the spiral strategy, president Tsuji, who was president during the period 
of 1986–1997, decided investment into LCD and developed final products 
including:“LCD Viewcam,” “Nintendo Gameboy,” and PDA “Zaurus.” Thanks to 
spiral strategy, by the time Mr. Tsuji retired as president, LCD panels and LCD-related 
products sales had grown to 3 billion USD and 3,5 billion USD. Total sales of LCD panel 
and applied products comprised approximately 30 percent of Sharp’s total corporate 
sales. 
 
Machida’s inauguration in 1998 
In June 1998, Mr. Machida was promoted from the foreign sales department to company 
president. In his inaugural press conference, he clearly set success of the LCD-TV 
business as Sharp’s next strategic goal: 
 
Machida (President): Sharp’s problem is low brand perception. For branding, we 
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have to make a “clear face” for customers. To this end, we will set LCD 
technology as our face. From now, every Sharp product will be related to LCD 
technology. TVs are a typical one. By 2005, we will replace all Cathode Ray 
Tube (CRT) TVs with LCD TVs in Japan. We commenced to produce LCD 
panels by ourselves, to increase brand perception. Customers did not evaluate 
our CRT TVs well, even though we produced them at the highest quality. The 
reason was that we did not manufacture CRTs by ourselves, but purchased them 
from external suppliers. To change our brand image, we have to produce a core 
device by ourselves … In August 2000, we will begin operations in a marvelous 
LCD panel plant at Taki. We have invested 60 billion JPY (500 million USD) on 
its construction. However, its attractiveness is not in the amount of investment, 
but in the way of production.
2
  
 
Sharp therefore started its LCD TV production. As the LCD TV market had not 
flourished enough and no other company had tackled it seriously, Sharp was actually the 
first major entrant. Sharp introduced a new brand, AQUOS (LC-20C1) to the Japanese 
market. Sharp realized a 40 percent price decrease compared to other company’s 
preceding models by aggressive investment into its LCD panel plant Taki.
3
 Although 
Sharp had a strict financial rule that a department’s investment must be less than 10 
percent of its sales, less than retained earnings, and less than annual cash inflow, Machida 
nevertheless executed investment beyond these rules. After that, investments in LCD 
panel production were always treated as extraordinary outside-the-rule cases.
4
 
 Thanks to the success of the AQUOS, Sharp gained an over-80 percent global 
share and 380 million USD sales in the LCD TV market in 2001 (Figure 3).
5
 In the 
following year, SONY and other rivals entered the LCD TV market, but Sharp maintained 
a greater than 50 percent share and grew sales to 710 million USD.
6
 Machida gained 
confidence in his strategy since Sharp was able to achieve great success even while the 
                                                   
2 Shukan Diamond, January 15, 2000, p.115. 
3 Nikkei Electronics, January 15. 2001, p. 40. 
4 Saji CFO, Shukan Diamond, October 13. 2001, pp 92-93. 
5 Shukan Diamond, February 16, 2002, p.20. 
6 Nikkei Electronics, October 21. 2002, pp.26-27. 
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LCD industry environment worsened.
7
 
 
Machida (President): The founder, Hayakawa, said “seek unique technology.” I 
put it in another way, make “only one” product ... When I was the sales manager 
of CRT TV, retailer sales staff asked me, “Whose CRTs does Sharp use for TVs?” 
I felt mortified. However, now AQUOS could get a better valuation than any 
other model. This is the power of “only one” product. Our employees are 
increasingly coming to understand this.
8
 
 
 
Figure 3: Worldwide market share of LCD TVs. 
Source: (2001, 2004) Nikkei Electronics, Mar. 26. 2007,  
(2007) Nikkei Business, Apr. 7. 2007 
(2010) Nikkei Business, Dec. 13. 2010. 
 
The Kameyama plant 
Along with Machida’s desire for the possession of a strong core device, he realized a 
greater investment into a new LCD panel plant named Kameyama in 2001. The amount 
of investment reached 1.25 billion USD. It started operations in January 2004, and Sharp 
gained the world’s largest panel production capacity. It annually produced more than a 
million LCD panels for TVs, and earned some billions USD. The Name “Kameyama” 
                                                   
7 Nikkei Business, April 8, 2002, pp.31-33. 
8 Shukan Diamond, November 22, 2002, pp.58-59. 
Market 
share 
(%) 
Year 
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became the symbol of Sharp.
9
 
 Machida decided to invest in Kameyama because competitors quickly caught up 
with Sharp both in terms of product technology and manufacturing capacity. Around 2001, 
Sony, Samsung, and LG decided to enter the LCD TV business and invested as much 
money as Sharp. In 2002, Panasonic started producing TVs with an alternative technology, 
Plasma Display Panel (PDP).
10
 To compete with those who had larger financial 
capabilities, better brand perception, and more distribution channels, Machida thought the 
higher production efficiency of LCD panels had come to be a clear competence of Sharp. 
Therefore, Machida and his colleagues changed their strategy. They stopped allocating 
resources to departments other than those involved with LCD-related products, and 
focused them on LCD-related areas. 
 
Machida (President): Sharp will pursue success in the LCD business. We will do 
everything for LCDs continuously: R&D, panel production, and TV production 
within Sharp. However, because of resource limitations, we will focus on LCDs 
and stop investments in other areas of business. At first, we decreased 
investments into our semiconductor business. We have to change traditional 
modes of thought about our resource allocation.
11
 
 
Saji (CFO): The Kameyama plant will make LCD panels twice as large as those 
of Samsung. It will be more efficient than any other rival plants. In the LCD 
business, the source of competitiveness is efficiency. Even then, the timing of an 
investment is ultimately decisive, so we have to consider the timing and scale of 
our investments carefully.
12
 
 
Within the construction term of Kameyama, Machida decided to conceal the 
manufacturing technologies and know-hows used in Kameyama in what he called a 
                                                   
9 Nikkei Business, February 2, 2004, p. 9. 
10 Nikkei Microdevices, July 2003, pp.147-148. 
11 Nikkei Microdevices, March 21, 2002, p.12 
12 Shukan Diamond, February 1, 2003, p.92. 
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“Black box strategy”. This is to prevent technology leakage from Sharp to rival 
companies, since they could start LCD panel production by transferring technology from 
Japanese equipment manufacturers and other panel manufacturers. While Samsung and 
Sony jointly established an LCD company S-LCD in 2003 and LG and Philips 
established a joint venture in 2002 to share production and technical development costs, 
Sharp decided to remain independent. 
 
Machida (President): It is a mistake to set plants carelessly in an emerging 
country to obtain cost competence. Technical spillovers are very rapid in those 
countries. Therefore, we decide to master integrated manufacturing within Japan. 
Integrated manufacturing is our lifeline, our 21st century vision, and our unique 
capability to generate “only-one” product. 
 In fact our share has declined in standardized LCD-panels supplied for PC 
monitors. But high-definition LCD-panels for TVs have remained competitive. 
To make such LCD panels, firms have to accumulate several pieces of 
know-how. Due to a lack of this know-how, other companies cannot produce 
LCD panels as well as Sharp does. Sharp alone has the proper knowledge for 
this, and should protect it, in the same way traditional Japanese eel restaurants 
protect their original sauces.
13
 
 
Competition intensifies 
Though the Kameyama plant brought Sharp considerable profits and sales from 2004 to 
2008 (Figure 4), the business environment in LCD TVs worsened. In 2004 and 2005, 
S-LCD, LG-Philips, and Taiwanese LCD panel suppliers like AUO and CMO started the 
operation of a large LCD panel plant.
14
 Their facilities were as large as or larger than 
those at Kameyama. As they continuously invested, their LCD production capacities 
exceeded those of Sharp (Figure 5). In 2005, Sharp’s TV share fell to 21.9 percent, while 
LG-Philips increased to 14.7 percent, Sony’s reached 11percent, and Samsung reached 
                                                   
13 Nikkei Business, January 5, 2004, pp.42-43. 
14 Nikkei Microdevices, September, 2004, p.151. 
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9.8 percent.
15
  
 
Figure 4: Sales and Operating profits of Sharp Corporation. 
Source: Sharp Corporation security report, 1989–2013. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: LCD panel shipment amounts for TVs 
Source: (2000, 2003, 2006) Nikkei Electronics, Mar. 26. 2007,  
(2009) Nikkei Business, Dec. 13. 2010 
 
Under this intensification of competition, Sharp’s managers decided to change the 
business domain, while they maintained the policy of investing in LCD panel production. 
                                                   
15 Shukan Diamond, April 16, 2005, p.117. 
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They targeted the final product LCD-TV market and component LCD panel supply 
market simultaneously. In the LCD-TV market, Sharp decided to focus on the Japanese 
market where it already possessed largest share and brand perception, while it did not 
focus on competition in foreign markets. In contrast, in the LCD panel business, Sharp’s 
managers decided to pursue the global market, since they thought their LCD panels were 
better performing than other external suppliers like AUO and CMO. Thus, they allocated 
more resources to panel sales than before. 
 
Machida (President): We will try to keep greater than 50 percent share in world 
LCD panel production. Half of our products will be sold to other LCD TV 
manufacturers, and the rest will be used for our own TVs. Such a plan can be 
achieved if we continue to invest in production capacity. Only 3 percent of the 
global TV market has been replaced by LCDs and PDPs. From our calculations, 
world total LCD panel and TV capacity will be 4.5 times than what it is now. 
Rivals will make huge investments in the near future. To catch up with rivals, we 
will also maintain our investments in LCD production capacity.
16
 
  
To cope with this substantial investment, Sharp accelerated its concentration of 
business areas. In 2005, managers decided to withdraw from the personal computer 
business and reduce activity in home appliances.  
 
Machida (President): Now we have reached the time to decide whether the home 
appliances division continues, because it cannot make a profit even if we shift 
production to emerging cost-competitive countries. Also, the PC side of the 
business faces a difficult situation. Therefore, we have decided to stop allocating 
large amount of resources to them.
17
  
 
Keeping LCD panel capacity enlargement and changing marketing strategies 
After starting Kameyama Phase 2 operations, Sharp’s LCD-related division’s sales 
                                                   
16 Nikkei Business, January 5, 2004, pp.42-43. 
17 Nikkei D&M, February, 2004, p.24. 
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increased by a few billion USD every year. Sales of LCD panels and TVs came to 
comprise over half of Sharp’s total sales in 2006 (Figure 6). In the period from 2005–
2008, Sharp showed its best financial performance each year, though the business 
conditions of LCD panels and TVs gradually deteriorated. Sharp’s share of the global 
LCD TV market fell from No.1 to No.3, after Samsung and Sony.
18
 Sharp also faced a 
hard fight in the LCD panel business. Machida planned for approximately 50 percent of 
LCD panels to be sold externally, but the result was approximately 20 percent due to 
severe price competition.
19
 
 
Figure 6: Sharp’s LCD-related division sales and ratio to corporate sales 
Source: Sharp Corporation security report (2002–2012) 
 
In 2007, Machida handed over the role of president to Katayama. “To support young 
Katayama,” Machida took up the newly-made chairman post, which had the right of 
representation. The Machida–Katayama diarchy structure was thus formed.20 Under the 
Machida–Katayama structure, Sharp maintained the same basic policy of focusing on 
LCD device business development, with some modifications. In 2007, Machida and 
Katayama decided to invest in a new facility: Sakai. The amount of investment was 
                                                   
18 Nikkei Microdevices, July 2006, p.97. 
19 Shukan Diamond, April 16, 2005, pp.117-118. 
20 Nikkei Business, March 19, 2007, p.8. 
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approximately 3.4 billion USD. 
 
Katayama (President): When I was an engineer, I had a plan of building an LCD 
industrial complex like those in the petrochemical industry. The strength of 
Kameyama Phase 2 lies in vertical integration from LCD panels to final products. 
We will evolve such a vertical integration model at Sakai site. We are planning 
to gather several component makers and infrastructure companies together in the 
Sakai site.
21
 
 
In contrast, Machida and Katayama modified the company’s marketing strategy with 
changes in the competitive environment. First, Sharp altered the target market of their 
TVs from Japan to the world. Sharp lost opportunities to obtain a larger global market 
share since it focused on the Japanese market (Table 1). To improve world-wide sales, 
Machida and Katayama decided to shift marketing resources allocation from Japan to the 
United States., Europe, and China. 
Table 2: Market share of flat panel TVs, 2006 
 Japan U.S. Europe China World 
Sharp 41 11 7 3 10 
Sony 19 13 13 5 12 
Samsung 0 12 20 5 17 
Philips 0 13 19 3 11 
Source: Nikkei Electronics, Mar. 26. 2007. 
 
Machida (President): I do admit that we failed to capture the global market … At 
first, we will execute a marketing program in the U. S., and next we will take up 
the challenge in Europe, where we did not have strong distribution channels. The 
developing speed of international competitors appears quite threatening to me 
now. In several business areas, the competitive environment changes rapidly 
these days because of the entrance of foreign newcomers.
22
 
 
Second, Sharp ceased its secretive independent “Black box strategy.” Katayama and 
Machida sought a potential partner able to develop LCD technology and business with 
                                                   
21 Nikkei Electronics, August 13, 2007, p.9. 
22 Nikkei Electronics, September 25, 2006, p.170. 
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Sharp. Considering the capacity of Sakai, they felt that Sharp needed partners who would 
constantly purchase LCD panels from them. In 2007, Sharp established a special task 
force to make alliances, and it achieved an alliance with Pioneer in September 2007, 
Toshiba in December 2007, and Sony in February 2008.
23
 
 
Katayama (President): The market size of LCD TVs will grow continuously for 
a while. To keep up with that growth, we have decided to find partners with 
whom we can jointly invest in and develop LCD panel facilities. Moreover, the 
alliance is important from the viewpoint of stable operations. 
Of course, we are not going to change the basic policy of pursuing unique 
device technology. We have to keep our sales volume sufficiently high to invest 
in the next technology, but it becomes difficult to do this by ourselves. So we 
have decided to run our business together with our partners.
24
 
 
A stumble 
After 2008, when the sub-prime shock’s influence spread, Sharp came to suffer from 
both a decrease in sales and an increase in operating losses. In March 2009, Sharp reported that its 
annual corporate sales had fallen and its net loss came to 1.2 billion USD. This marked the first 
instance that Sharp announced a net loss after being listed on the Tokyo stock exchange in 1956. 
 Machida and Katayama acted quickly. They closed the obsolete Taki and Kameyama 
plants and declared a strategy change. Sharp agreed a contract with a Chinese company, Nangjing 
Panda, to whom it sold Kameyama Phase 1’s production capacity together with technical support. 
 
Katayama (President): We have already recognized our mistake that we produced 
TVs within Japan and then sold them to global customers. So we will quickly 
change our business style to one of “locally produced and consumed.” Sharp will form 
partnerships with some Japanese and international companies to prepare a new LCD 
technology and facility. By using partnership contracts, we will limit our own 
investment and get cash flow by offering technical support to our partners.
25
 
 
                                                   
23 Shukan Diamond, January 26, 2008, pp.109-113. 
24 Nikkei Business, April 7, 2008, pp.7-9. 
25 Nikkei Business, July 6, 2009, pp.22-24. 
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However, they still continued construction and investment in the Sakai plant. 
Katayama explained such action like this: 
  
Katayama (President): It is not contradictory to our new policy of “locally produced and 
consumed” that we continue producing LCD panels in Sakai. It can take on the role of a 
“Mother plant” of our global LCD panel facility network. We will build our advanced 
technology in the Sakai mother plant, and then give it to our global partners. 
26
  
 
Uncompleted restructuring 
Although Sharp modified its strategy in 2009, its crisis continued. Machida and 
Katayama continued to set LCD panels as Sharp’s core competence. Sharp did not 
invest in businesses other than LCDs. Thus, Sharp’s sales and profit exclusively depended on 
LCD TV and panel sales. However, in terms of LCD TVs, Sharp’s share was only 6.4 percent, 
ranking it No. 5 in the world, while Samsung, at 18.8 percent, ranked as a top seller. The situation 
was the same in the LCD panel business. Companies that targeted emerging countries did not 
purchase Sharp’s high price panels, so the Sakai plant’s operating rate did not rise above 
approximately 50 percent. In 2011 Sharp’s annual sales dropped approximately 10 billion USD 
lower than that in 2008. Net losses came to 3.7 billion USD. Since Sharp relied on debt and did 
not have enough liquidity on hand, it nearly went bankrupt. 
Katayama resigned as president to take responsibility for this huge loss, and Okuda 
became the new president in March 2012. However, the actual situation did not change. 
Katayama remained on the committee board as a chairman after Machida. Machida retired as 
chairman, but he still had influence on Sharp’s management, since Okuda was under his guard.27 
They executed some strategic modifications and countermeasures for the immediate 
financial problems. However, they essentially continued the LCD focused strategy. 
 
                                                   
26 Shukan Diamond, September 18, 2010, pp.22-23. 
27 Some analyst thought the struggle for power among Machida, Katayama, and Okuda 
was one of the reasons that Sharp was unable to change in 2012. (Shukan Diamond, May 
25, 2013, pp.10-12) 
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Okuda (President): In the era of globalized competition, our independent vertical 
integration strategy had limitations. We have to increase our speed, through utilizing 
collaborations with other companies. We will depend on foreign partners for new 
product or market development, and we will focus on technological development of 
core devices. Our LCD devices are still competitive. By enhancing this technical 
competence, we will survive as a device supplier.
28
 
 
Sharp’s managers decided that it would become a panel supplier, and they made efforts to 
forge partnerships with companies that facilitate the consumer product business. They signed a 
contract in which Honhai would invest 6.5 million USD in the Sakai plant and pay several billion 
JPY to buy Sharp’s TV plants. Okuda also agreed to contracts with Apple, Qualcomm, and Intel 
in 2012.  
 In addition, Okuda tried to reduce employment costs. Okuda cut down the number of 
regular employees for the first time since Sharp was listed in 1956. Sharp employed 56,756 
personnel at that time, and he decided to eliminate approximately 8,000 jobs from across the 
entire global production chain. At last, approximately 11,000 employees were let go due to an 
unexpected increase in early retirement. 
 These efforts helped Sharp move further away from bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the 
fundamental problem of its dependence on LCD panel production did not change. Thus, sales and 
profit did not recover in the depressed economy. In March 2013, Sharp reported that net losses 
were 5.4 billion USD. To take responsibility for these losses, all three leaders, Okuda, Katayama, 
and Machida left Sharp. At this point, the influence of Machida was completely extinguished. 
 
Analysis and discussion 
The variety of degrees of attention paid among issues 
From here, let us make links between fact findings and theoretical considerations. 
Looking back the Table 1, Figure 2 and the case description (it is summarized in Table 3),  
                                                   
28 Nikkei Electronics, April 2, 2012, p.15. 
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Table 3: Summary of the Sharp case 
Year 1998–2000 2001–2003 2004–2006 2007–2008 2009–2011 2012– 
LCD panel 
Manufacturing 
Construction – Taki 
plant 
(0.5 bil USD) 
For starting 
LCD-TV  
Construction- 
Kameyama plant 
(1.5 bil. USD) 
For production 
efficiency 
Construction - 
Kameyama P.2 
(3bil.USD) 
For developing panel 
supply business 
Construction – Sakai 
plant 
(3 bil. USD) 
For differentiation 
Investment on Sakai 
plant (1.5bil.USD) 
as technical transfer unit 
 
Investment stop 
LCD related business entry to LCD TV 
business firstly for 
branding 
Keeping the leader 
position in LCD TV  
Developing LCD 
panel supply business 
as well as TV 
business 
TV: Change the target 
from Japan to Global 
Panel: Keeping Hi-end 
segment. 
making alliance with 
global firms 
Start technical transfer 
business 
focus on LCD panel 
supply 
Non-LCD related 
business 
 Decrease of product 
line of LSI 
Withdrawal from PC 
business 
Retrenchment from home 
appliances business 
  
Business 
Situation 
Low performance 
in CRT TV 
business 
Over 80 percent 
share in LCD TV 
Share down in LCD 
TV 
Severe competition both 
in TV and panel 
Sub-prime shock 
deteriorated  LCD 
business 
Financial crisis. 
LCD panel is 
commoditized 
 
  
  
we can reconfirm that Sharp’s managers paid most of their attention to LCD panel 
development and production, and they persisted in possessing and investing in them. 
Such an adherence to the LCD panel facilities limited Sharp’s strategic options and 
brought on the crisis. These findings are consistent with the past research about cognition 
and organizational change indicating that managers are unwilling to change answers for 
the issues in which they were most interested (Kaplan et al, 2003, March and Simon, 
1958, Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). 
Next, from the case, we can indicate that Non-LCD-related departments except 
for solar cells were disposed of, as competition in the LCD-related business accelerated 
(Table 3). The semiconductor department was curtailed in 2001, PCs in 2005, and home 
appliances in 2006. Managers recognized those products were difficult to develop, both in 
terms of business and technology. Multifunctional printers had some degree of presence 
in the market, but managers did not invest in those areas. Revisiting Figure 1, we can find 
that those products were positioned always nearly outside the area of focus. Figure 1 
shows that Sharp’s managers did not mention non-LCD-related business often: seven 
times for IC (four times especially for withdrawing from it), four times for home 
appliances, once for multifunctional printers, and PC’s were never actually discussed. To 
summarize, managers disposed of or ignored products viewed as being nearly outside of 
focus. This finding is also consistent with previous studies (Gilbert, 2005, Ocasio, 1997, 
Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972). 
From Figure 1, we can say that issues concerning the LCD-TV 
business strategy, mobile phone business strategy, LCD-panel supply business, 
alliance policy, branding policy, health instrument business strategy and 
business model were shifting around in the focus of their attention. Those 
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issues were dealt with when managers recognized they were important. They 
were characterized by frequent changes in answers. Figure 2 shows the 
frequency of answer change tends to be higher when the amount of deals is 
lower. In other words, Sharp managers tended to keep answers unchanged for 
issues which managers always paid attention to and to change answers 
frequently for ones that managers only sometimes paid attention. 
Let us examine in detail the situation of frequent changes in issues and answers. 
Concerning the business strategy for LCD-TVs, Sharp managers always paid attention to 
it, but they changed answers for it semi-regularly. They decided to enter into the large 
size LCD-TV market as a substitute for CRT-TVs in 1999. They gave the role of branding 
for the LCD-TV business in 2001, but they changed it to Sharp’s main business in 2004. 
They changed market focus from Japan to Global in 2006, began focusing on the 
high-end segment in 2008, and focused again on the Japanese market in 2010. About the 
alliance policy, managers decided to become independent in order to hide Sharp’s 
technology and know-how in 2002 (it appeared in the security report in 2004). They did 
not consider it during the period from 2005–2007, but they reconsidered it in 2008 (it 
appeared in the security report in 2010) and started alliance building to facilitate the 
technology transfer business. Furthermore, Sharp managers tackled issues about business 
model change from 2009, while they had never dealt with it by 2008. Such flexible deals 
for issues and answers were quite different from those for always-central issues and 
issues always outside of attention. Therefore, we can add up a new proposition about the 
dealing with managerial issues and answers: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. Even when managers persist in specific answers for central issues, 
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they have a certain degree of freedom for choosing which issues to attend to and answers 
for them. 
 
Issue and answer selection as a tactic for a temporary expedient 
From this case, we pointed out an example of flexible changes in issues and 
answers for maintaining the answers to central issues: the policy of internal LCD panel 
development production. Checking the narratives, we find that Sharp managers changed 
their explanations for possessing LCD panel facilities in the changing business 
environment. In 1998, when Machida was promoted to president, he decided to construct 
a new LCD panel plant for making LCD TVs. Its objective was to improve brand 
perception. In 2001, Machida decided to invest in a new plant called Kameyama, for 
realizing more efficient production to compete with larger rivals like Samsung and Sony. 
When Sharp was constructing Kameyama Phase 2 in 2004, managers explained that they 
had to enlarge capacity for developing the panel supply business and TV business 
simultaneously. When continuing investment in the Sakai plant, Sharp managers 
explained that Sakai was vital as a “mother plant” for facilitating partnerships. Frequent 
changes in the business strategy for TVs, mobile phones, and panel supply, business 
model, alliances policy, and branding policy had been done in accordance with those 
explanations. 
From these considerations, flexible changes toward which issues deserve 
attention and answers could be explained as a way of temporary expedient. When 
decision-makers persist in specific managerial policies, they have to develop rational 
reasons to convince internal members, external stakeholders, and also themselves, of the 
validity of their policy. And those reasons have to be modified as environments changes. 
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Therefore, decision-makers frequently change the meaning of the central policies, and 
modify peripheral settings around them. Such flexible but temporary adjustments to 
environmental changes are explained as an aspect of justification for immutable core 
policy (Festinger, 1957, Staw, 1981, Staw, McKechnie, and Puffer, 1983). Suchman 
(1995) discussed, in the context of organizational legitimacy theory, there are three tactics 
for justification: (1) efforts to conform to existing situations, (2) efforts to select among 
multiple environments, and (3) efforts to manipulate environmental structure. Those three 
tactics could be seen in Sharp managers’ treatment of issues, except for those about LCD 
panel department. 
Thus, Sharp’s contrasting stickiness to central issues and flexibility for others is 
thought to be two sides of the same coin: the target and the means of justification. Sharp’s 
managers wanted to keep the policy of possessing LCD panel production and 
development departments, so they modified answers for several related issues to give a 
suitable meaning to LCD panel production and development. As the environments 
changed, the attention distribution of Sharp’s managers was restructured. Along with this 
attentional shift, they altered the choice of which issues were attended to and their 
answers, and used them to justify the possession of LCD panel department. Consequently 
we came to a proposition about the relationship between central issues and answers and 
those related to central ones: 
 
PROPOSITION 2. When managers persist in specific answers for central issues, they 
flexibly pick up other issues and give answers to them to justify the central issue. 
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Flexible issue and answer selection rather intensifies rigidity 
Flexibility about peripheral issues and answers is important in the sense of administrative 
science, because it prevents drastic organizational changes. If Sharp’s managers did not 
change market strategy or alliance strategy so flexibly, or if they did not notice 
environmental changes, Sharp’s strategic inadequacy would have become obvious earlier. 
Then, they could have changed their solutions to LCD panel production and development. 
Flexible changes of which issues to attend to and their answers around the true center of 
attention disguised the essential problem occurring in the central issues and answers: The 
inadequacy of excess LCD panel production facilities. Thus, we can discern another 
proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 3. Flexible changes of issues and answers for the sake of justification 
prevent drastic organizational change by disguising the inadequacy of fixed answers for 
central issues. 
 
Past studies stress that rigid cognition prevents organizational change by 
bringing adherence to central issues and ignorance to outside ones (Leonard-Barton, 1992, 
Triopsas and Gavetti, 2000). By introducing an attentional view that issues and answers 
are moving up and down in managers’ minds, we added another impact of rigid cognition 
on issues and answers to the middle of both. Flexibility in selecting issues and solutions 
is sometimes quite problematic because it disguises fundamental problems occurring with 
central issues, because such flexibility would be brought about by the justification bias 
that makes managers keep their core strategies unchanged (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Ways of dealing with issues in focus, outside of focus and in-between when 
managers have adherence 
 
Limitations 
This study has some limitations. First, this is an inductive case study, so empirical tests 
are out of scope of this paper. Future work could test numerically the propositions derived 
from this study. A related problem concerns the duplicability of the phenomenon. We 
cannot say that firm managers always show flexibility in issues that are not placed at the 
center. How often and when this flexibility occurs should be examined in the future. To 
solve these problems, not only quantitative tests but also several other qualitative case 
analyses are needed. 
Despite these limitations, we can nevertheless conclude that firm managers 
change which issues they attend to and their answers when they have a certain degree of 
adherence to central issues and answers, and it enforces the rigidity of their decisions for 
issues in their focus. As this study is for hypothesis generation, future research should test 
such hypothetical relations with more strict methods. 
 
Managers’ 
rigid 
cognition 
Modification of selection of 
issues and answers in 
accordance with the situation 
Keep answers unchanged 
Disposal of issues or 
ignorance to select answers 
Rigidity in 
Strategy 
choice 
Issues always in the focus of attention 
Issues always outside of attention 
Issues moving between focus and 
outside of attention 
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Conclusion: implications for academics and practitioners 
In this study, we searched for the effect of managers’ cognition on issue selection and 
organizational inertia. Previous studies mainly investigated the cognitive effect on issues 
either in the focus of attention or those outside of it. In order to refine the understanding 
of rigidities in making strategy, we introduced the idea that the degree of importance of 
different issues was changing. By examining the transition of issue selection, narratives 
by managers, realized strategy, and the final outcome from the case of Sharp crisis, we 
found that managers’ adherences bring certain flexibility in selecting issues and answers, 
but it rather reinforces rigidity in making strategies for their central issues. 
 Finally, we would like to discuss the implications for practitioners. Our study 
suggests that organizational evolution is prevented not only by poor managers but also by 
smart ones. Managers who understand the business situation and possess good judgment 
often fail to make changes if they persist in something critical in changing environments. 
In such a situation, flexible peripheral tactic changes do not refer to the capability to 
change, but really mean that managers try to justify their current strategy. In this sense, 
managers should be reflective about their fundamental beliefs, when they confront 
environmental changes. 
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